Taliban Policies Amount to Gender Apartheid in Afghanistan

• Interview with Richard Bennet, UN Special Rapporteur on Afghanistan

Yasin Samim: 

Thank you, Mr. Bennett, for taking time from your busy schedule for this interview. We are honored to learn from your expertise and insights.

This interview has three objectives: The first is to assess the short-term and long-term impacts of Taliban policies on the social, psychological, and economic well-being of women and girls. The second is to gather insights for better advocacy on women's rights in Afghanistan. The third is to explore potential legal consequences for Taliban officials under national and international law, along with informed advocacy options.

First, may we record this interview so we can transcribe it accurately for publication?

Richard Bennett: I fully agree, and I am ready to start the discussion.

Yasin Samim: I would like to begin with an overall review of the situation for women and girls in Afghanistan under Taliban rule. No one is better informed than you, given your research, advocacy events, and many public appearances through interviews, statements, and conferences.

In this regard, there are two questions: How would you describe the current situation for women and girls in Afghanistan? And what are the main factors affecting their rights under the Taliban?

Richard Bennett: First, thank you for your commitment to human rights and women's rights in Afghanistan. My overall observations about Afghan women and girls are in my public reports and statements.

My research and investigations show that Taliban policies and regulations have seriously removed women and girls from public spaces and limited their participation in all areas of life. Women and girls under Taliban rule continue to face widespread human rights violations. Restrictions on education, employment, and freedom of movement have severely reduced their ability to take part in society.

There are inadequate protections against violence and discrimination. The dismantling of legal and institutional frameworks that once safeguarded women and girls has made them far more vulnerable to risks.

The ongoing humanitarian crisis worsens these vulnerabilities. Many face poverty and lack access to essential services, including healthcare. Recently, new laws, especially the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice law, have consolidated previous edicts and added more restrictions. These include requiring a mahram(companion) even for short distances and limits on women's voices. The law also bans images of living beings in the media.

This mistreatment is often presented as Sharia to protect women and their dignity in an "Islamic Emirate." But it has no parallel in other Muslim-majority countries and clearly violates international human rights standards.

On this issue, some countries have recently initiated a dispute against Afghanistan under the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). This is the first interstate legal action against the state of Afghanistan, currently controlled by the Taliban. It could reach the International Court of Justice.

In my analyses, I have referred to gender persecution. The current treatment of women and girls in Afghanistan rises to the level of gender persecution, a crime against humanity. Individuals could face prosecution at the International Criminal Court.

Finally, Afghan women and many others find that "gender apartheid" best describes their situation. Gender apartheid is not yet codified in international law or a binding document. But there is a global campaign to include it in a potential new treaty on crimes against humanity.

Yasin Samim: Thank you, Mr. Bennett. That was a clear and detailed overview of women's rights restrictions under the Taliban and efforts to protect them.

As you noted, these restrictions affect not just legal status and basic rights but also have economic and psychosocial impacts. Let's move to the first section of our questions.

As an organization focused on legal education and advocacy for women's rights in Afghanistan, I want to know: How have Taliban edicts and practices, particularly the recent morality law, impacted the fundamental rights of women and girls? Do these policies affect women and girls across all communities equally, or are there differences based on ethnicity, sect, region, or other factors?

It would also be very helpful if you could share specific examples of the daily impact on Afghan women and girls.

Overall, we want to understand the effects of Taliban decrees, policies, and actions on women's fundamental human rights and freedoms.

Richard Bennett: These policies certainly have major impacts. Girls above grade six cannot officially attend public or private schools. Women face employment restrictions; they cannot work for the UN or international humanitarian organizations, for example. They are limited to a few private-sector industries.

The policies also affect access to healthcare, since women must have a mahram. Under the new law, this applies even to short trips, unlike before, when the distance was about 78 kilometers. Going to a clinic can now be very difficult.

There are many more impacts, but I do not have time to cover them all in detail.

On another level, bans on education and employment have intergenerational and economic effects. Imagine a whole generation of girls growing up with only six years of schooling; they will face severe limits on job opportunities.

The Taliban believe women should stay home, care for the family, and do little else. This has huge long-term consequences.

On your second question, whether impacts are equal across communities, I use an intersectional approach in my work. This means examining overlapping forms of discrimination.

For example, a Hazara woman faces more challenges than others. It worsens if she is a single mother, a widow, or has a disability. Ethnicity, religion, or disability adds further layers. It is important to apply this intersectional analysis. Those providing support to women and girls in Afghanistan need it too, to reach the most vulnerable.

You also asked for specific examples. There are many showing how policies affect daily life. Despite bans, some women access limited justice or education. As you know, underground and online schools exist, though quality and numbers are limited. Thanks to Afghan women's resistance and external support, girls get some education.

In the legal field, supporters help female lawyers continue, often behind the scenes. This varies by province. In some cases, women cannot appear in court but can prepare cases and assist male lawyers.

Overall, access to justice is very difficult. Female lawyers are barred from courts, and roles like prosecutors and judges for women have been eliminated.

Some gray areas remain: certain female lawyers and organizations still operate, thanks to women's courage and Afghan groups. This is not with Taliban approval; it mirrors underground education.

Bans on female judges, prosecutors, and defense lawyers violate international human rights standards, including CEDAW and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Afghanistan's judicial system under Taliban control shows serious breaches of ratified treaties.

Yasin Samim: Thank you, Mr. Bennett. That was a thorough, evidence-based explanation of Taliban policies on legal and human rights for women and girls.

You mentioned "intergenerational and economic" impacts. Building on that, let's discuss psychological, social, and economic effects in more depth.

Two questions: What are the immediate and long-term effects of these policies on the psychological, social, and economic well-being of women and their families? What long-term consequences do you foresee if they continue? Could you give examples of immediate effects?

Richard Bennett: In the short term, economic impacts are already clear. For example, UN Women estimates the economy loses up to $1 billion a year because women cannot work or contribute fully.

Some women still work in the private sectors like agriculture, health, or education. But the overall effect is huge. Women's private businesses suffer from restrictions like mahram requirements.

I have also noted that women-led organizations must register under a male family member's name. This has practical and psychological consequences.

Psychological impacts are very serious. We often hear despair from girls denied education, they say their hopes and dreams are buried. Depression is widespread, and at the extreme, suicide rates among girls (and some boys) have risen in various provinces.

So immediate psychosocial and economic effects are severe.

Long-term, we cannot predict exactly, but confining women and girls to the home will cause lasting economic and psychological harm.

We already see rising early marriage rates. Due to poverty, parents cannot support children, so they marry off girls as young as 10-12 or even sell them for survival money.

This links economic hardship directly to psychological trauma—for the girls and often whole families. Some families do this to protect girls from forced marriages by Taliban officials.

These policies will also mean Afghanistan lacks professional women, doctors, lawyers, teachers, and others that society needs. Girls are illegally denied education and jobs. Intersectional effects will hit hardest those facing multiple forms of discrimination. As many say, no country can prosper if half its population is excluded from public life.

One more point: Children growing up now may access limited madrasa education, but the Taliban aim to normalize this. They want less resistance over time, especially from women and girls, to align people with their ideology.

They seek long-term control and broader acceptance of their views through education limits, media restrictions, and curbs on information and expression. They want people exposed only to their thinking. But this is harder now than in the 1990s. Most have phones and technology. Basic literacy allows access to outside ideas.

The Internet remains open, and even girls with a grade-six education can pursue online learning. Technology, external support, and Afghan girls' determination make it tough for the Taliban to impose their ideology fully.

Yasin Samim: Mr. Bennett, you shared important examples on this topic. I recently read a report from an international human rights organization noting changes in family attitudes toward girls' education and work, some negative shifts even in communities like the Hazara, long known for supporting girls' education.

Reports show declining family support since the Taliban's return. Could you explain these social impacts?

Richard Bennett: This is an important issue. Let me give a few examples.

I have heard from mothers that their sons or other male members of their families now treat them differently. Their sons used to respect their mothers' freedom, for going shopping or going outside the home, but now they repeatedly question their outings or hijab and try to control them.

We also see rising domestic violence against women. Respect for women's dignity has fallen. In the Taliban system, men are positioned as superior, influencing home behavior and increasing gender-based violence.

Another recent example: Women-led organizations registering with the Taliban's Ministry of Economics must use a male family member's name. Women leaders gradually lose independence. In some cases, male members take control without expertise, even though the organization's focus is on women's issues. These show how Taliban policies affect women and girls in many aspects of social life.

Yasin Samim: Thank you, Richard. We have covered social and economic aspects well, with realistic daily examples.

Common questions from experts, journalists, and advocates: What national and international legal consequences—if any—could Taliban officials face? How can international mechanisms hold them accountable for violations against women and girls?

Richard Bennett: We can look at consequences through international criminal law or human rights law.

On criminal law: The International Criminal Court is investigating Afghanistan and can prosecute serious discrimination against women and girls as gender persecution, a crime against humanity. Individuals, including Taliban leaders, could face jail.

There are also non-criminal judicial actions. Some states have challenged Afghanistan's CEDAW violations, potentially leading to binding orders from the International Court of Justice against the state or controlling authority.

Treaty bodies like the CEDAW Committee will review Afghanistan soon and issue findings. My reports and others go to the UN Human Rights Council and General Assembly, affecting recognition and international cooperation with the Taliban.

The gender apartheid campaign currently has no immediate effect, but could create long-term legal accountability if codified. These are some key legal paths.

Yasin Samim: Mr. Bennett, thank you for clarifying criminal, non-criminal, and human rights mechanisms to pressure and hold the Taliban accountable.

Recently, Canada and countries with feminist foreign policies issued warnings to the Taliban on CEDAW. What progress has there been? Do you expect tangible results short- or long-term?

Richard Bennett: These actions help isolate the Taliban and build consensus on their serious violations of women's rights.

Importantly, Muslim countries—including the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC)—have stated that Taliban practices toward women and girls do not align with Islam. Their interpretation is far from other Muslim nations. Prominent Islamic scholars have supported this through fatwas-a form of Islamic legal opinion. 

There are also political consequences. The Doha process continues. Some push for armed resistance out of frustration, but exploring legal options is vital. An established international legal system exists, which Afghanistan joined long ago. Even as de facto authorities, the Taliban bear responsibility for harms to Afghans.

Yasin Samim: With our discussion on legal mechanisms and consequences, are there historical precedents where international law held violators accountable in similar cases?

Richard Bennett: I do not have a long list focused on women, but many cases exist where perpetrators faced trial and imprisonment for human rights abuses. Often not specific to women, but covering torture, child rights abuses like child soldiers, and universal jurisdiction—trying crimes committed elsewhere.

Examples include Afghans convicted in the Netherlands and the UK. Other ICC cases involve Palestine genocide allegations or the Rohingya in Myanmar, plus human rights violations like torture in Syria.

These show that UN and ICC mechanisms can bind anyone. Enforcing against regimes like the Taliban is hard, but possible through Security Council or General Assembly consequences.

Yasin Samim: We follow efforts to protect women's, girls', and citizens' rights in Afghanistan. Your office is central since your UN Human Rights Council appointment.

Questions focus on UN bodies and the international community: What strategies should international and local human rights organizations adopt for more effective advocacy? What role should the international community play in protecting Afghan women's rights? Finally, how effective have your office's accountability efforts been so far?

Richard Bennett: On the effectiveness of national and international groups: They are vital and influential. Strong coordination and unity in the crisis are key.

They can play three roles: Document violations with high-quality field evidence, especially on women's rights; analyze and provide sound recommendations to global bodies; and conduct coordinated advocacy through politicians, webinars, media, and conferences.

On the international community's role: Canada can use its feminist foreign policy, aligning with the women, peace, and security agenda. Actions should match commitments, as by raising Afghanistan globally.

Afghanistan needs UN Security Council focus, as over 40 countries were once allied against the Taliban. Most Afghans supported those values, creating ongoing responsibility. It was not just occupation; Afghans sought peace, rights, security, education, work, better life. Now they face punishment for those efforts, so the community must stand with them.

On my office's effectiveness: Reports assess political and rights impacts to find alternatives. If limited, I consult Afghans and stakeholders for new approaches to increase results.

Yasin Samim: Thank you for your dedication to human rights. Much documentation and advocacy have occurred, but as Afghans say, "action speaks louder than words."

What is the relationship between the UN Human Rights Council and other UN bodies? What can increase advocacy impact?

Richard Bennett: Expectations for international bodies are often unrealistic. The Human Rights Council issues reports, statements, and mechanisms, but lacks enforcement, relying on persuasion. Similar for the General Assembly. The Security Council has stronger tools like sanctions or force authorization, which are unlikely now in Afghanistan.

We need realistic expectations from international organizations. At bilateral and regional levels, we have and will continue to cooperate with countries and groups, and this has been positive. Individual countries and regions can sanction Taliban travel/finances and condition normalization/recognition.

I have urged avoiding normalizing unacceptable behavior. Taliban should not get bilateral recognition, UN seat, asset release, or banking access without conditions.

A UN assessment proposed Taliban engagement with intra-Afghan talks. Talks should include women and civil society. Any normalization needs verifiable benchmarks on women's and human rights. This is difficult; negotiating with a forceful group offers little leverage.

Yasin Samim: Perhaps politics is linked to human rights agendas. In Doha, regional and other countries lack consensus, affecting Taliban relations.

Richard Bennett: Yes, Taliban show strong unity via rigid ideology, emphasizing negotiation solidarity-despite reported Kandahar-Kabul differences, while the international community lacks a unified plan. Countries like China, the UAE, and Uzbekistan move toward recognition; others stay distant. No agreed approach.

Yasin Samim: Thank you so much, Mr. Bennett. We are wrapping up. For advice: What can organizations like ours do for more effective women's rights advocacy in Afghanistan?

Richard Bennett: I have covered much already. Accountability matters—judicial internationally, but also locally. Transitional justice, like truth-seeking, community discussions on grievances, Afghan dialogue for solution, especially on women's rights, could help, though hard now. 

Note For the Readers

This interview comes from a 2024 series of discussions. Yasin Samim, a founding member of the Forward Together Development Network (FTD-N) conducted the interviews with experts on human rights, Islamic studies, and women's rights. The aim was to document and highlight the Taliban's harmful policies toward women.

The interviews were published in Dari and Pashto on the website of Etilaatroz Daily, an independent news outlet now operating in exile.

We thank Etilaatroz for their partnership. We now publish them in a shorter version in English to reach English-speaking readers and activists. The situation remains severe and has not improved since these interviews were conducted.